University of Central Florida

STARS
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements
1-1-1934

The last stand of dialectic materialism: A study of Sidney Hook's
Marxism
Max Eastman

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact
STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Eastman, Max, "The last stand of dialectic materialism: A study of Sidney Hook's Marxism" (1934). PRISM:
Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements. 759.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/759

THE LAST =AND
OF

DIALECTIC
MATERIALISM

THE LAST STAND OF

DIALECTIC
A Study

of Sidnty Hook's

Marxism

MAX EASTMAN

. -.

.. . -

POLEMIC PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK, 1934

.

-

I

I

r t

THE U S T STAND OF DIALECTIC MATERIAu~'
A Study of Sidney Hook's Marxism
Eightp-five y e a n after the Mamian theory was propotllldc4
and fifteen pears after Lenin and the Bolsheviks, acting upits principles, overthrew an empire and laid the foundationr'
of a socialist society, a gifted young philomphcr arises to tell
us for the first time what Marx meant by what he said. The
yowig man is John Dewey's favorite pupil, Sidney Hook, rmuthor of a compact little book, The MetaphysiCJ OfPragmatism,
in which Dewey's philosophy is extended with original sk&
And what Mam meant by what be said, according to Sidney
Hook, is substantially identical with Dewey's philosophy, which
be is careful to identify as "scientific pragmatism" in contraet
to the "mystical pragmatism" of WiUiarn Junes.
I think the significance of this event has been missed both
by Hook's friends and by those irate priests of the or&&
faith who have of course denounced him as a "petty bourgeois
ddntion." H e is something far more instructive than that,
if you msider the exact nature of his exploit.
"It is Marx's meaning that must first be discovered," he
hginrs, "before we ask whether his teachjhga arc true or false.
,.It is an open question whether Marx's opponents have mom
violtntly distorted his doctrine8 than his orthodm friends. But
as to whether both have radically misunderstood him there
scms to me to be no question at all."*
And by "orthodox friends" Sidney Hook doe$ not mean
only the remoter ones, Laf argue, Liebhecht, Rosa Lwembourg,
b i n , Trotsky, Plektranov, but dso Friedrich Engefa, Marx'r
cloac bosom companion and the cwreator of his datrine. Em
gels not ody misconstrued the argument of Das Kapitd, but
"in his exposition of Mam's philosophic position" commitpbd
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deviation from M a d s views."* And not only
wc may add our mitt to Hook's
dilrovcry-failed to bear his own meaning in mind,
Engcls' principal deviation read to him for his a p
pronounced it good
It would be easy to smile away the presumption of this
~7
--- I .young man who alone knows, and knows better than Marx did,
-;_
what he mtmt by what he said. But that would be superficial,
& as a personal judgment, erroneous. Sidney Hook is trying
?
paliantly, and with a ztorlous love for the mind of Karl Mam,
to defend his philosophy and make it stick fast in an age and
,. '.
nation that is sceptical of supcr+3cicntific philosophies. He is
making a last stand in defense of dialectic materialism against
the attitude and methods of modern science. He alone of all
those defending this philosophy is acutely aware of the gulf
between its classic formulations and the modcrn scientific pointof-view. H e alone is boId enough to throw overboard as nonMarxian dl these classic formulations-cspecially those of the
Russians who took the philosophic srde most seriously-and
go back to Marx himself, who did not formulate it, and to
whom therefore ht can, with a more plausible success, ascribe
whatever progressive views he finds essential.
Sidney Hook has two faults of miad, or faciIities, which
help him in this operation. One is a tendency toward pedantry
--that disposition t o employ large terms for simple concepts
md display learning for its own sake, which makes scholarly
controversy rso often resemble a dog a h o w i f you can imagine
dqp barking largely about their own superior points in a comptitive display. In these artides on Marxism, for instance,
Hook keeps his opponents under a veritable barrage-fire of
erudite terminology, describing Marx's philosophy not only as
dialtctic materialism, which seemed good enough to Marx, but
aa "nqturahtic actiGrm," "social bthaviorism," "revolutionary
voluntarim,'' '4voluntaristichumanism,'' L'voluntaristicrealism,"
"advistic atheism," "critical bistoricism," "realistic evolutionary
naturalism," "Aristotdiallim saturated with temporalism," and
o&cr lollg-tailed horny epithets very disheartening to a man not
accustomed to take his vacations in a library. And he frightens
..
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A STUDY OF SIDNEY HOOK'S MARX

them out of their wiu with
mation as that Mam did not
what wc mean by science, and
discussion as to whether Marxism is a science or not''
oif its base.* Were he not merely deploying em
purposes of schreckiichkeit, Mr. Hook could hardly fa
that our discussion is as to whether Marx was what
by scientific or not, and that therefore the explosion o
.-'
h *cant does not knock us flat.
However, it is not Hook's academic s c h r e c r 8 l i c k k ~ t - a l a ~
ing as it is to a rather fitful scholar like myself-that ir m W .
dangerous in his enterprise of reinterpreting Mamidm It: ib
the infrequency with which he adoptil a genuine attitude of . I
'E
inquiry. He seems always to be sold to some idea, and udng
his nimble facukies in order to win out, not only over opponen+,
I
but over documents and facts.
I
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It seems to me, for instance, a kind of cawistry not &
point out, when you art convicting Engels of a '4definited&stion" from Marx's views, that Marx read over and stppm*
tbe principal work in which this deviation m r r e d . H d
wants us to believe that Marx invented a new methMo1agy in
the social sciences resting upon a "functional" and not a "cqf
theorp of knowledge, and that Engels, who worked with him
alt his life long, was unaware of this, and Marx hiiself so
forgetful of his own "distinctive contribution to the history of
thoughtw*that when Engels presented for his approval a f o d
=position of their views containing the old copy theory, he
made no demur. Tbe tale is improbable, and Hook holds badr
its most improbable detail.
"Since the views deveIoptd here were in far thc greater
part originated and develo ed by Marx," says Enge.1~in a preface to the Rsti-Duhring,
nd only in the smaUest part by mel
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THE LAST §TAND OF DIALECTIC MATERIALISM

was self-uuderstood between us that this exposition of mine
read the
e manuscript to him before publication, and the tenth chapof thc -ion
about economics
was written by Marx."
In dimming EngcIs' "deviation" in this book, Hook is
eful to remind us that Marx wrote a chapter, but omits to
mention that Marx heard and approved the rest.
It seems t o me also an evidence of the non-inquiring mind
that Hook ahodd forget, in discussing this matter, Marx's own
avowal of a copy theory of knowledge in that celebrated passage
in his aecond preface to Capital, where for once he speaks in
his own voice about his own philosophy.
"Mydiatettic is not only fundamentally different from that
of HegeI, but its direct opposite. For Hegel the thought-process
which under the name of Idea he converts into an independent
subject, is the derniurgos of thc real world, which forms only
its outer appearaict. With me,the other way round, the ideal ie
nothing else than the material transformed and translated in

d d aot be completed without his cognizance. I

. ..

the human head.''
Marx does not, to be sure, use the word copy or ''reflection" here, as his American translator docs, but he gives no
reason to suppose that he does not mean the same thing that
Engels does in his corresponding passage :
"We rt-conceived the ideas in our heads matcrialisticaIly,
as copies of real things, instead of real things as copies of this
or that stage of the Absolute Idea.
Thereupon the dialectic
of ideas.bccamt itself only a conscious reflection of the dialectic
movement of the reaI world, and thereby the Hcgelian dialectic
wan iltood on its head, or rather upon its feet, for it was already
standing on its Read."*
You see how united the two minds were.

.. .

A TEXT MISREAD
Hook has only one .ground fo calling this copy theory a
"dtvirrtion" from Marx. His wh e argument rests on those

d
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A STUDY OF SIDNEY HOOK'S MARXISM
Theses On Fcuerboch where Marx is commenting, in
I&@'
"hastily scribbled down,"* on Feuerbach's s d d 'w.
- :.
ism"--his attempt to cast off the idealist philosophy df H&and reconcile his religious emoti
of the world. Feuerbach managed
Hegel's opinin about the compara
sense-experience. In order to reach
cording to Hegel, it is necessary to depart from ~ense-e
(generally referred to as Sinnlichksit) in the direction of
Feuerbach simply asserted that, on the contrary, s e n ~ e r i m c c
is the real thing, and ideas are secondary.
"Truth, reality, sensibility,'' he cried, "are identical . ,
Only sensibility is truth and reality. Where there is no sense,
there is no being, no real object."**
This gave him a feeling that he was on solid ground, that
hc was back in the real world where straight-talking practical
men live. But he further observed that men do not have even
rsensaexperience without some flicker of feeling, some interested
attention. And by playing up &is fact, he managed to drag in
44
passion" under the concept of sensibility, and arrive at the
conclusion-astonishing enough to one not solely concerned to
validate the Christian emotion-that "Only that atis which is an
object of passion." And with a littIe more obscuring of diatine
dons, sufficiently important to a realistic mind, he contrived to
make this read: "Not to love and not to be are identical."
Which is, for emotional purposes, equivalent to the older saying:
"God is love."
In this operation it is quite obvious that Feuerbach had
to pIay fast and loose with the distinction between sensation and
the objects of sensation. And that, of course, is what he did
In his principal theoretic work, Grundsltze der Philosophic dm
Zrrkunft, he used the word "sensibilitp" indifferently in both
meanings. It is equally obvious, however, that his metaphysics of
love will hold water, if a t ail, only so long as he ignores the inda
pendent existence of the object and sticks to the identification of
"sensibiIity" with the material reality of the world. "Truth,"
he must maintain, as he d&s indeed say, "is onIy the totality
'
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THE LAST STAND OF DIALECTIC MATERIALISM
af hutam lift and experience." And he did in the main dwell
in this p o s i t i ~ least
t
until long after Marx TR$B through
6 t h bim, when in his Esscact of Religion he took that step
which he himself described as "no less than a leap . from
the Gothic cathedral of man's being to the heathen temple of

. .

-

I
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Even there he failed in his effort to grant independent
~ealityto nature, as may be seen in his statement: "Sensibility
means to me the true, not thought and not created, but existing
unity of the material and spiritual, and is therefore with me
the same thing BS reality.'' For our purposes, therefore, the
drift of Feuerbach's "materialism" is contained in the earlier
statement: "Truth, reality, sensibility are identical.
Only
sensibility is truth and reality. Where there L no sense, there
is no .real object."
NOW
1et US see what comment Marx "hastily scribbled
downt* after studying this peculiarly half-hearted materialism.
Mane accepted without protest the off-hand identification of
scnwptrience with objective reality, but remarked that
Feuerbach had failed to conceive this "truth, reaIity, sensibility,"
n-sensible activity3'-had failed,
ly." Here is a11 that Marx said

.. .

..

"The chief fauh of a11 materialism heretofore (induding
Fcuerbach's) is that the object, reality, sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) ,
is conceived only under the form of object or of contemplation;
not as human-sensible activity, Praxis, not subjectively. Hence
the active side developed in opposition t o materialism abstractly
from idtsrlis~bstractly,because idealism naturally did not
recognize real sensible activity as such. Feuerbach wants objects
of sense really distinguished from objects of thought, but he
does not conceive of human activity itself as objective activity."
And again :-"Feutrbach, dissatisfied with abstract thought,
wmta contemplation (sense apprehension) ; but he does not
conceive the sensible as practical human-sensible activity."
And still again:-"The highest point reached by contempIativc materialism, that is, materialism which does not conceive
sensibility as practical activity, is the contemplation of separate
individual8 and bourgeois society."

A STUDY O F SIDNEY HOOK'S MMXHM

-

1

'

On the basis of these statcmenta, H d mrts that - h' h .disagreed with Feucrbach'r belief that "rematimu were lmrmP : - :
edge-bearing repam of the objective world." For-Mlrrsg dihs 6
, says, sensations were "not knowledge but stimuli to howl-''
T
.enabling mcn to "react upon and change their conditioning ._cnvironrnent." And he asserts that EngeIs deviated from thb
wisdom in accepting "the crude formula of Fcutrbach according
to which sensations are images and copies
of,the extend.
world."*
I do not know whether to be more astounded, here, st
the bad scholarship or the dazzling imagination. The remark
about Feurbach shows mere superficial reading, or no r e a h
at all. Any good history of the matter will tell you that Ftuerbach never confronted the problem of tbe relation of mind to
the external world (Hirffding's History of Philosophy, for instance.). But if you read even a few sentences of Feutrbach's
own vital writing, you will see that he could not confront thh
problem without sacrificing that anthropological philosophy, or
philosophy of human love, to install which in the place of
theology was the goal and motive of his whole life's work.
More impressive than this allusion to a non-existent "mdc
formula of Feuerbach," however, is Sidney Hook's wild flight
of imagination in regard to Mam His love for the idea of
Marx's mind seems here to go over into blind infatuation. He
seems simply to shut his eyes and wiiI to believe that Marx
knew all that man can know. M a n did not say that sensstions are not knowledge-bearing reports of the external
world, nor did hc sap that sensations are stimuli to
knowledge, nor did he say that they enable us to react on and
change the external world. He said, on the contrary, as plainly
as words can say it, tbat sensations and the external world are
the, same thing, and that that thing is to be conceived subject W y as practical Ausaaa?ressibk activity, A centuy of cdture
-a century and a hemisphcrc4ie between these statements
and those that Hook attributes to him. This hastily jotted
note of Mam is extremely Hegelian. It reveals a mind not
haif-way emerged from the idealist philosophy.
Of course, Marx did come farther over into the common.

. ..
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THE LAST STAMD OF DIALECTIC MATERXALISM

sense view of the world than these words imply. In their
matured reflections, neither Marx nor Engels identified human
sensation with the objective reality of things. Neither if you
take his word for it, did Feuerbach.
"A human being," said Feuerbach, "is a creature who is
distinguished from the sun, moon and stars, from stones, animals and vegetables, in a word, from those beings which he
designates by one general name, 'nature'. Consequently, his
imager or perceptions of the sun, moon and stars and other
natural beings, although products of nature, are yet distinct
from those objects in nature of which they are the perceptions."
And Engeb asserts more than once that our "sense-impressions,"
as well as our "thoughts1' and "ideas," are "copies," or refl;cctions" of an external reality. Indeed, he once expressly
contradicts M a d s statement that they should be conceived
"subjectively." "Insofar as our sense perceptions are confirmed
by experience," he says, "they are not 'subjective'
" Lenin
is quite right when he asserts that "the doctrine of the independence of the outer world from consciousness is the fundamental proposition of materialism." And he is justified in summing up the mature Marxian view as follows: "Things exist
outside of us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. The
verification of these images, the distinction of true and false
images, is given by practice."
How shall we reconcile this with Marx's hastily scribbled
thesis which identifies "reality" and the "object" with sensibility, or aease perception? In exactly the way Marx would, of
course-by understanding the thing in its historic development.
Anyone in a state of youthful revolt ap*nst Hegel's mystical
assertion that the essential reality is idea, and that in order to
embrace reality in its purity we must move away from the crude
impressions of the senses, from "Sidchkeit," is naturally going
to shout: "Sinnlichkeit-that is truth, reality. That is the real
object. The thoughtsbject is what is unreal." That is what
Feuerbach shouted, and that is what M a n repeated after him.
That is what the Theses On Feuerbmh are about. They do
not even touch upon the true problem of a materialist philosophy
as it appears to one who comes to it from the side of s c i e n c e
the problem of the relation between sense-impressions and out
II
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,d comes a l p aa far rre Marx had in, S~W
s nat yet &st.
He ia m e d y comcmcd w
validity of body as against spirit, of sensation

In my

opinion, the dialectical materialists have n m r
d confronted
y
the true problem of materiafisrn. The proof
ttrot thcy have not is that thcy continue to lump "aensatian~and
idcss" together and merely to assert that the mind aB a wh~le,
or ' L ~ ~ n s c i o ~ ~ nise srs copy
, " or reflection of the external world.
If you arc going to confront the problem as it arises oat of
ruenc+aar Galileo raised it, in the first place, with his assertion
that tastes, odors, sounds$heat, and so fortb, art not objectively
red-your first step will be to recognize the increasing divergence between sense-impressions and conceptual knowledge. 'Ib
a scientific m i n k mind realIy liberated from the idealist p4iL
osoophy or unscathed by it, and not troubled at all to prove that
the world is not a Divine Spirit-that divergence forms the
the starting-point, of the question what ths
rld is. Neither Engels nor Lenin, nor so far
aa I know, any dialectic materialist, seems adequately aware of
*is divergence. Engels says that the discovery of a Iabaratory
method of creating "the coloring matter in the roots of madder"
proves that our idea (and our sense-perception) of this sub.
stance have objective validity. Our idea in the laboratory is
that this substancc has no color at all, but i s a mtrc collocation
of atoms, electrons, and so forth. Our sense-perception, and
oar idea in poetry and daily life, is that rhc substance is red.
The question is which of these mental states has objective vaE
iditg, and whether they both have, or perhaps, since they differ,
neither of them. And that question Engels* experiments could
never d v e , nor did Engels ever raise the question. Engtlr
txprcssly s a p that the whole question between materiaHsm and
idtalism is as to whether "nature" is first and "spirit" second,
ox wice vwsu-a question of abandoning religious mythology. A
modern sceptic of the concept "matter," like H d e y or Karl
Pcarson, has no illusions about "spirit" coming first, and is
wholly beyond this question of religious mythology.
Lenin is equally unaware of the problem as it stands in

~
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THE LAST STAND OF DIALECTIC MATERIALISM

minds untroubled by the fear of religion. He thinks that the
whole dimasion began with Bishop Berkeley and is exhausted
when the Bishop'e d d God is removed, He too speaks rashly
of the color red.
"We ask," he says, "whether or not objective reality is
mumed as given ua, when we see red.
If one holds that it
L not given, then he is relapsing . . . into subjectivism and
aguosticisrn.
. If one holds that it is given, then a certain
phiosophic doctrine necessarily follows. Such a doctrine has
long since been worked out, namely, materialism. Matter is a
philosophic category which refers to the objective reality given
to man in his sensations, a reality which is copied, photographed,
reftcctcd by our sensations, but which exists independently of

.. .

..

them."*
On another pagc-concerned merely to prove the existence
of an objective world-he says :"If coIour is a sensation dependent upon the retina (as natural science compels you to admit) then the light rays falling on
the retina produce the sensation of colour. That means that
independent of us and our consciousness there exist vibrations
of matter, or ether waves of a certain length and certain velocity
which, acting upon the retina, produce in us the sensation of one
colour or another. That is how naturaI science regards it.
The various sensations of one colour or another are explained
by science in terms of various Iengtha of light waves existing
outside of the human retina and independently of man. Such
is the view of materialism. .. "**
Is the coIor red a "copy," "image," "photograph" of "ether
waves of a certain length and a certain velocity"?
Of course it is not. And it is exactly this divergence of
conceptual knowledge of the world from sense-perception of ir
which originally raised the problem h i n pretends to be attempting to solve, and which continues to raise it Iong after
Bishop Berkeley's God has gone to rest. Lenin is not attempting
tb solve this problem, nor even to answer the arguments of
those who proposed to sohc it in the manner of Mach. If he

.

Mafwklirnr A d Empirio-Criiih, Coil:ct#d Works English tranmtatiw) VoL
.13, p 101-2.
H IbM,, p. 34.
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were, he c d d not po4bIy makc that crude blunder.
w l e truth is that Ltnin's work, so far as concerns M d ,is
no philosophic argument a t all, but a tirade against rr sciatifi~
mind occupied with a genuine problem which Lenin, still lingering in the convalescence from metaphysical idealism, m o t
wen see. It is fantastic to regard Lcnin's book ar a contribution
to the questions raised by the steadily increasing divergence b ~ tween science and the Iife of the s c n s e ~ s o l v e dquestions all.
It is stdl more fantastic to go back and ascribe to Marx h d f
in ~845-for the mere reason that he wanted to bring Htgcl'a
emphasis upon action into a world cortceivtd in terms of scnsa complete grasp of the whole problem, and a modern American
dution in which the mind is conceived, in a complttely post-Darwinirn manner, as an instrument of "adjustment" to the "en~ironment." Especially so when, as wt have seen, what Marx
actually said was that the enwirontnent itself, the "object," "reality,'' "the world revealed to the externaI senses" ( I quote PI&hanov's translation of Sinnlichkcir) is to be conccivcd "subjeo
tively" and as "practical human action."
Feuerbach has got far enough, Marx said in effect, to see
that sensation or the object of sense is the real thing and the
idea or thought-object derived, but he has not yet arrived at
the corresponding view that practical action is the real thing
and theoreticai reasoning derived. Feuerbach has not yet got
right down into the real world where those "objects of sense"
are in a state of "practical human-sensible aaionW-and that
means action directed toward ends having value-in short, t*
ward the social revolution. Until you put this practical action
right out into the red world by calling it the essence of sensation
and the senseobject, you will never get beyond the contemplation
of separate individuals and bourgeois society, for that ia all
there in in the cxi~ringworld to contemplate. In other words:
If you do not read your purpose to change the world into the
world itself, you cannot be at the same time realistic and purposive. You cannot be a "materialist" and strive toward an
ideal unless you conceive matter itself as striving toward your
ideal.
It was because he had thus succeeded in conceiving tbc
real world and the knowing mind i s cooperating in a practical

14
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&ctivity, that M a n could declare the highest wisdom to b t
" 'the revolutionary', practical~riticalaction.'' I t is because he
had succeeded in fusing the object and the true perception of it
into st single act, a process toward a goal, that he was able t o
idcntify theoretical and practical knowledge, science of history
d t h program of action toward communism, and find the end
of all philosophy, the triumphant swan-song of every supreme
dart to understand the world, in the very act of changing it
for the better, because thar act of practical change i s what the
red world is. That is what Marx meant, and that is what his
words say, in the Theses On Feuerbach.
For HegeI's mttaphysic of Reality or the "absolute being"
as Idea, with its conservative political implication, Feuerbach
substituted a metaphysic of the absolute being as "passion," with
evangtlical or "true" socialism as its political implication. And
for Feuerbach's metaphysic of passion, Marx substituted a
metaphysic of purposive action as the essential Reality, with
political implications which Itd to the Russian revolution. All
three systems are metaphysical and literally animistic, each
stres8ing one of the three attributes of mind-thought,
feoling and, in the essence of the thing, will-in its account of what
is ultimately "real". That is the story told by these theses. And
they all three, notwithstanding the scientific fruitfulness of
Marx's thought, stand wholly aside from the progress of science.
Abandon the improbable assumption that Marx invented
fifteen years before the publication of The Origin OfSpecies a
view of the mind quite obviousIy attributable to the "influence
of Damin," and the further improbable assumption that having
invented this world-startling idea he never took the trouble to
develop it or even to write it down intelligibly, and the further
improbable assumption that besides not writing it down, he
never explained it to his dose intellectual friend, who shared
aII his labors, and the further improbable assumption that when
this friend read over to him an official exposition of their common views containing crass statements to the contrary, he ncver
bothered to offer a correction, and the further improbable assumption that he himself in a preface to his maturest work made
a statement to the contrary, and the further improbable assump

I
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minds of the calibre of Rosa k b o u r g , Fmaz
Mehring, PItkhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, have throughout their
lifetimes believed in and developed the Marxian philosophy In
total ignorance of what its main point is, and the further improbable assumption that in the year of our Lord, 1929, a papa
of John Dewey suddenly found out that this main point is miraculously identical with the main point in john Dewey's in~trumental theory of knowledpabandon all thest fantastic rssumptionr, and sit down soberly and examine what M a n actually
said in his Theses On Fcwsrbah, you h d that he said nothing
whatwer offering the slightest ground for this myth. There is
no "deviation" of Engels and there is no supernatural dairwyance of Man. There is merely Sidney Hook tallring about
what people say without paying attention to their actual words,
A trace of the mental process by which Hook built up this
myth of the dairvoyancc of Karl Marx is to be found in his
earliest translation of the first Thesis on Frucrbdrh. Here, by
inserting the word something and by changing an adverb to m
adjective, he made Marx say that reality shodd be conceived,
not "~~bje~tively,"
but objectively. The translation reads as
follows :"The chief defect of all previous mrtcrialism
is that
the thing-the
r e a l i t y - p e r c e p t i b i l i ~ a s been conceived of
only under the form of the object or of direct apprehension;
tnmthat

.. .

not as sensible human activity, Praxis, something nor subjective."*

By reading "something not subjectivc" instead of "not subHook made Marx say the exact opposite of what he

jectively,"

actually said. A strange way to prove that aU other Matian5
have "deviated" from the thought of Marxl Hook has now,
in his recent book, corrected this error in translation, but he has
in no wise altered the inferences which rested upon it. I should
Eke to ask by what process of reasoning Hook managed to
attribute to M a n the same philosophy and theory of knowledge,
no matter whether he said reality should be conceived "rubjecd
tive1y" or as "something not subjective."

THE UST =AND OF DIAILE(3TIC MATERLALISM

WHAT MARX BROUGHT FROM HEGEL
Hook's casuistry, of course, has no ignoble motive. A
Talmudistic infatuation with the mind of Karl Marx
is common enough, and also natural enough, in these days when
tveotr have given Marx an indubitable place among the biggest
men of history. It is nevtrtheless disastrous to the further
progress of revolutionary science-and moreover extremely uunMantian.
It should be po~dble,without loss of admiration for Marx's
genius, to sec the retrograde significance of these Theses.
After rejecting Hegel with extreme scorn in favor of Feuerbach,
who "placed philosophy in the negation of philosophy,"* and
then after rejecting Feuerbach, too, and emphatically announcing that he did not want even that much philosophy, but was
going straight down into thc real world of muItiplc material
facts and write empirical science, Marx felt lost.** He felt
lost because of his passionate revolutionary idealism, and because, being a German philosopher, he did not know what to
do with it, He did not h o w where it should find a place to
exist, after those Britishers and Frenchmen--and even Feuerbach with certain sentimenta1 compensations-had excluded it
from their conception of the objective world. He felt lost, and
he went back to Hegtl--not in order to get the "active side,"
the "dynamic principle,"*** not in order to convince himself
that the world is moving and changing. Everybody knew that;
the French rationalists were IiteralIy drunk with the idea of
progress; Comtt had already founded sociology as an evolutionary science. He went back to Hegel to get some method of
reading the change he wanted, and Iris own action-practical
action in a revolutionary directioa-into the very stuff of this
state of

h i d pcrbap ny,q f he had mwcdcd In rejeaiag &mi, he roo&
haw
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new material world that Be found so real and so crriting.
And of course the method was ~trictlyH+lian. I do not .'--:
j !I
b
w
o how Sidncy Hook, who appears t o b. on terms of indmtc
.i
understanding with Hegd, can fail to realize how natnrd it was,
and h ~ w
inevitable, that Marx-a fervent Htgelim up to the
a p of t w e n t y - f i ~ h o u l d ,in jotting down some thmghta upon
E'cutrbach, follow him in his casual identification of "waeibilitp"'
or the act of sense-perception with the reality of the material
world. For in Hegel's view-if X may push my more shlbbom
understanding this far--that identification was of the essence
of the tale. The world was not matcrirl, but mental, and the
very process af the arising of sense-perception was to be explained as a gradual coming back to itself of this mcntajntss
after its "alienation" in matter. Hegel says in so many words,
speaking of the "process of perceiving" and the "object ptrceived" :-"The object is in its essential nature the same as
the process."* And he shows bow sophistical and inadequate
this process is when it is relied on to give us knowledge of the
pure and essential entities, which art the "objects of thought."
Upon this very ground he derides the pretensions of "sound.
common sense," which he identifies with perceptual understanding. What could be more natural and absolutely inevitable
than that Mam and Feuerbach, returning to "sound common
sense" after their alienation in the philosophy of Hegd, should,
off-hand, identify the real material objects in a commonsense
world with "sensibility," or the process by which minds come
in touch with them?
Let us quote once more that revealing conversation+
"Truth, reality, sensibility," said Ftuerbacb, "are idtntical. . . Only sensibi1ity is truth and reality. Where there is
no sense, then is no being, no real object.''
Quite true, replied Marx, but this "object, reality, sensibility" must be "conceived subjectively." It must be conceived,
juet as Hegtl used to conceive the ideal object, as "practical
activity,'' as action toward something hightr. Else what is to
become of thc revolution?
Is anything in mentaI history more clear?

.
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"A-is+ wittrout passion is a being without being," said
Fcucrbach.
hthe contrary, said Marx, "reality" must be "conceived
a8

...dm.''

Hwk tdls us that Marx, "as a dose student of Hegel's
Pkkommologk des GGisrcs . . considered the chief contribution of Gcrman classical philosophy as opposed to metaphysical
m a t e r i r l i to be its emphasis on the activity of mind."* hle
for*
that thia so active mind was not only mind, but also the
8 u b s t ~ c tof the world, and its activity on a world scale was
congtaial to the philosaphtr. I n that c o a g e ~ i dacfiwity of the
world c m c e i w d as m i ~ dlay the essence of Hcgel's philosophy,
approadd from the standpoint of his own interest, and of our
hkmt, in it-approachtd
from the standpoint of a scientific
or merely,sensible understanding of what such philosophies are.
And it was that congenial activity of the world--not our modern
Beast of the activity of mind irr and upon the world-that Marx
br~u&t from Hegel and embedded in those celebrated Theses
On Fcwrbrrch, where mind and the world together arc nothing
but pradcal action in a revolutionary direction. The Theses
arc ju* celebrated. They ought to be singled out by all historiof the nineteenth century and marked with a p;rtat signpo& reading:

.

DETOUR I
At this point the gcience of social revotution, given a fair
start by the French enlightenment, makes a one hundred year
detour through German philosophy. It will be back in 1945,
enriched by r vast knowledge and a true method of procedure
and successful experiments on a large scale, at a more developed
scientific point-of-view.

IV
ANOMISSFON, A SUBSTITUTION AND A FAIRY TALE
That a man of Marx's hard and penetrating mind ahodd
rest content with such a poor stab at a philosophy as this-a
T b aym~rbar,July, 1931.

'

in which the real object is conceived s'tlbjd-,,
,a
materialism in which matter fulfills the e ~ m t i dMOO,
bf
a p i r i w a n be understood ody when you remember that Mar*
never dwelt on or developed his philosophy at all. And that
a n be understood only when you realize that his central wi&
and purpose at the moment of writing those fragments which
=&in
it, was to get rid of "philosophy" Jtogtthtr. Thil
identification-"hastily scribbled downM--of sensation with material reality, and the two of them with practical human action,
enabled h h to combine his revolutionsry will with his conceptiw
ef the mrld, and that once accomplished, ht fled from the scene
*ere he had "planted the genial seed of the new philosophy,"
and never took a stroll in that direction again throughout his

life.*
Thew facts abo, however, are forgotten, or unconscio&led over, by Sidney Hook He tells us that Die Deutsthe
Ideologic, a manuscript completed in the same year in which
M a n scribbled down those theses, is "the most important single
source of the study of Marx's ph*dmophy."** And yet he
leaves his readers ignorant of the fact that this untrmslated and
rrther inaccessible manuscript contains r wholesale repudiation
of philosophy, a repudiation of the very idea that there can be
such a thing as philosophy, repeated t h e and again. 1 could
quote a wlid page of such statements r a the folIowing:
'We recognize only me single science, tbe scicna of b t o r g .
You can view it from two rid+ and divide it into the hiat~rgof
nature and the history of people
"
"
When you begin b describe reaIity, then m khpmdcnt
phiIasophy Iosa its mistenct-medium. In its place mrry be foud, at
the most, a summary of the g t n d resulw abstracted from pn in,I
vestigation of the hiaaorical development of man
'We fully realize that Feucrbaeh
wmt as far an a t h & r
could go without simply ceasing to be a theorher and a ghiE
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ampher.
"
"Feuerbach's mistake lies in the fact that he d d not a p p d
the world of ~nmtianwithout thc -which
ia to say, the egef*
the philosopher.
"
"And by the way, with this dew of things, which taka them
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as they are in d t y , dI dcepdhking ph;rompbical problcms reduce
t b m d v a to some simple question of cmpirid fact.
"
"For a practical mntuj&et, that is for e communist, the thing
M & nwrlutionk the &ring world-that
is, p d c a l I y turn against
tbhp ss be finds them, and change them"

.. .

I

This book was delivered to the publisher in 1845-1846,
and in 1845 Mnnr penned those famous Theses On Feuerbach,
conchding with this aphorism:
"Philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways;
the thing is to change it."
It is dear when the two texts arc juxtaposed that Man's

essential wish at that time, an tssential part of his meaning,
therefore, in the apothegm, was: Quir philosophizing and we
your brains in r scienri$c efort to change the world. But bccause he had not reaUy made the escape from Hcgelian animism
-&cause
he did not "mean what we do" by the word scientific
4
e apothegm remains equivarl. It is a good symbol of his
equivocal position, the position of a man who plants the seed
of a new philolsophy on the very day he st& out to root up all
philosophy.
Instead of presenting this puzzling state of afairs as it was,
Hook keeps under the tabIe Mam'a explicit but untranslated
repudiation of phiIosophy, and blandly reports that Marx, in
a perfectly Dewey-like manner, declared that phiiosophy was
henceforth to be "an instrument in changing the world,"* "an '
instrument of social liberation." * *
Besides thus shding away Marx's actual feelings about
phdosophy at the time when he wrote this thesis and throughout
his life thereafter, Hook keeps shuffling into view, without a
date, previous statements in praise of pbilosophy-youth ful
statements going way back to thc period when Marx was still 1
a Hcgelian. "Of philosophy in general," Hook admonishes us, I
who art merely trying to carry out M a d s wish to make the
revolutionary movement scientific, "it is well to remember Marx's
own caution that 'the ford that levera1 individuaIs cannot stom- i
ach modern philosophy and die of philosophical indigestion
proves no more against philosophy than the fact that here and

1
I

J
d af Philosopiy, VoL 25, Na 5, p, 129.
aa Pam Heed Ta Mum, TAr M d r m Q s s r h I y , Vol. 6, Ha 1, p 53.
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tc a boiler ~ l o d c and
s bIom several pas-~g
in@
against mechanics'." It b needas to eolp that
erwheImed by thh quotation when we remembtr
published in the summcr of x 84%-four years bcforc
very from Hegel had born its fruit in that wholcsak desrrm. .
on of philosophy which lies at the basb of, and can a l e
ain, his intelIectua1 life.*
Besides keeping out of sight this unqualified denunciation of
phvharacteristic not only of Ma=,but of the whoh
rn wkch he developed, the age of Comtt, Feuerbach,
amilton and MiII, Sidney Hook invests a veritable f d ~ t 8 h
accollnt for a well known later statement of Engels to the

.

.

"As soon," said Engels, "as each spcad science clarities
&a p i t i o n in relation to the. toialitg of things and our howlthen any speciaI science of this totality beoomcs super0uou~.
The only discipline that s u ~ v e sof the whole of traditional
phhwphy is the sdmct of thinkiag and its la-formal
logic
end dialectic. Everything else is absorbed in the positive sciences

+,

of nature and history."
To get this out of his way, Hook iavmts the story that
'Engels is here s p e w of o "future day" when social libcraticm
.&all have been accomplished, and in r c l a d a s society "dl
philosophy is transformed into science." ''Speaking of that
19
'. ,future day, Engels writes
hc sap, and then quota the
jsbove passage. A sheer act of fancyi It is dear in
'mvn words that be is not talking about any fume day.
;'dmply repeating the oId opinion expressed eight times h Die
' ,&~tschc Idtologic--"most important source for the ~tudyof
[ Marx'~phiiosophy"-that
from the standpoint adopted by
Mam and Engels philosophy is supt~uous.Repeating the atme
&ng in his Ludwig Fesrtrbach, Engels says explicitly that eht%'
warxian understanding of history
makes an end of p H +
wphy in the realm of history, just as the dialect undmtrtnding

. ..
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+

h a Riasawv, the R w s h who d o m a d and dcoiphmd Die DwtscRc f&kb&,
a atrlfidmtly orthodo* *xponeot of the soviet a t e p b p h y , b , ' 'dtb
ra~urkthat tbi early repudiation of pbilos~ph~
k tbt ow iaaporca~Xt c * e W n
m&incd ia it.
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of nature render8 every philosophy of nature useless or impob
sible."
It is obvious, however, from Hook's own definition of philosophy, as he puts it in the mouth of Marx, that no "future
b y , " no "social liberation" would ever make it superfluous.
Pbilowphy srccordig t o Mam, he tells us, is "a sociology of
vrluea, investigating the social roots and conditions of what
human beings desire . .a criticism of standpoints and lncthads
in the light of conditions under which they emerge and the purposes which they serve. . . . It is
passion or will conscious
of itself."*
Arc we to have no sociology in the classless society-r
no values? Is will never again to be conscious of itself?
Hook contradicts himself continually because he is trying
to be a child of two fathers. Philosophy here is ''an instrument
of soda1 liberation" because it is particularized thought, thought
brought specifically to bear on social and moral problems--and
that is straight from Dewey. Elsewhere-remembering Marxit is "philosophy as generalized thought" that "becomes an instrument in changing the world."**

.

...

MATERIALISM THROWN OVERBOARD
After throwing out of dialectic materidism the copy theory
of knowledge and the belief that philosophy is superfIuour,
Hook proceeds to heave over practically everything else except
the n a m ~ n that,
d as we saw, he has forty ways of amending.
Indeed, tbe next thing to go by the board carries a good half
of the name with it--namely, materialism. The word has meant
throughout history a doctrine of the fundamental stuff the world
is made of. T o this doctrine Marx adhered without reservation
before he went back to Hegel for the dialectic. In going back,
he criticised materialism for neglecting the "active side," and
H

Tkr M o d m QwIII#, VoL 6, Na 1, p. Sf.
3
d of P M m ~ f i y VOL
,
25, No. 5, p. 123.
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hewmtbarkto the i d e d h t t 3
ticised materialirrm in any other
l3 ..
Marx did not believe that matter b tht.c#untiJ
~uretythcWwi80nbintwto~
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materialism. H e &m&
r, that "dialectic materi-t
least in ib f
d e
not believe in a monism of stuff, but cmphsraizes a m+
."
A'stammer here in the shift from b e l i ~ eto.m p b

progress of science invalidate
aphysical position of mattridism."
c fact is that Marx believed, as Lenin did, that "the world
" but ht read into this matter
in the world as an ordered

erely repbed to Herr Dihhg'r attack on it.
; he merely replied to
in d v e d them in the

if that happened, the element of
ributian of human valuation and logical
e procedure to a "material*' world-would come clear.
come dear in the mind of the pmon writing it, and be
realize that he is abandoning empirical science, which ir
that M a n desired and that all loyal rwohtion~ry
to and keep up with,
sophits have devoutly wished to escape
ort and get cowlatiom, and have brought forth
ccaust
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their tricky dr piori conception as a quite candid lure to
the 'killto believe." Dialectic materialism, wishing to be unconsoled srnd practicaI-scientific but not knowing how, hides instinctively its animistic element, and the best way to hide $ i
P wientific world is not to write it clearly down.
C~~~
Nevertheless, it was clearly and naively written down twice.
Once when Engets said that, "The celestial bodies, like the formations of the organisms by which they are under favorable
conditions inhabited, arise and perish and the courses that they
run
take on eternally *tore magnificent dimensions"; and
once when Manr spoke of "the higher life-form toward which
the existing society strives irresistibly by its own economic
dcvtlopment" and declared on that basis thar the working dass
1b
has no ideal to realize, it has only to set free the elements of
the new society."*

...

HISTORIC DETERMINISM ABANDONED

Tht next thing to go by the board in Sidney Hook's effort
to keep dialectic materialism afloat in the waters of science is
historic determinism. Again we may ask why Manr and Engcb,
if they did not believe in a thing, adopted thc name by which
it is universally known. We ask in vain. The thing must go
overboard because it belongs to Hegel's anthropomorphic metaphysics and will not square with the modern concrete study of
bistoric events or the modern science of mind. Hook himself
conccdcs in one of his rare moments of candid inquiry that the
Marxian conception of "all history" coxltains an anthropomorphic elenieat, and that Marx confuses condition with cause.**
He refaaes to see the reason for this-namely, thar Marx has
read his purpose into "all history" just as Hegel did, and if
he is to cling to his purpose, then he must declare its fulfillment

'

'
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is no
in this philosophy is nothing

neetissaryIIy There

eftort Marx desiied to m
n with cause is a mere c o r d
e with nbc8ssury, wbich is the
rphic view. All the argument abou
frcawilI or necessity, fatalism or dtttrmini~,r a t i d .
h n t a r i m , efficacy of thought or that thought is an a&
orncnon-all is mere chatter in the dark, never to cthe ~implefact is recognized that Mam was a man of
and having read his purpose into history, he bad t~
tory carry it through.
a F believed in the efficacy of human action, but he a b
k v e d in enough determinism to bring his pIan for the organb t i o n of the working drss revolution, the dictatorship of the
@~lttariat,and the resulting communist society, into his account
# the necessary course of the historic process. Trotsky believer
h it to the same extent and for the same reason, as is shorn
in his recent assertion that "The victory of tbe Left Opposition
is historically guaranteed." Ltnin believed in it to the aamt
extent and for the same reason, as may be scea in this earliest
declaration of his belief:
"The idea of historic necessity does not in the bast undermine the role of personalities in history; history is all c o m p d
sf the activities of pemns, who arc indubitable p t a , The
red question arising in an appraisal of the a d a l activities of
pcmm is: In what conditions are these actions p a m t e c d
auccesa ? Wherc Is the guarantee that this a d o n will not remain
a solitary deed drowned in a sea of contrary activitiesT'*
All Lcnin needed to believe in order that his own pemonsrlitp
t did
sshould function as it did, was that success is pessible. H
not need to believe that it is g~arauteed. Such guarantees belong to religion and not experimental science. But k i n , like
,km,
had an immature mceptim of what it is to be scientific,
and for that reason only-for he was the last man in the world
to embark on a "quest for certainty"4e formdated his attitude at reflective moments in this language of the historic or
:dialectic asc~ssityof the commrrnist regime.
Wllr dr4 T b Prim& Of The Pmpht (1895).

I
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'I'hat Mam formulated bis attitude in the same way is
notorious. It is needless to pile up quotations. The Communist
Manifesto asserts that the fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory
of the proletariat are "equally inevitable." In r 882, introducing the first Russian Edition, Marx and EngeIs described the
Manifesto itself as "a proclamation wherein the inevitable disapptsrana of present-day bourgeois property relations was
heralded." Marx declared in his celebrated letter to Weidemqer that his whole original contribution had been t o prwc
that the cIasa struggle "leads necessarily to the dictatorship of
the proletariat" and that to the society of the free and equal.
In the face of these and many other explicit statements, and
with the startling fact that Marx believed in the "iron necessity
of socialism"* re-echoing throughout all revolutionary litttaturc
shcc The Copnmsrnist Manifesto, Hook puts on a scholarly
face and calmly informs us that, although "Mam soft-pedals
on some occasions the voluntaristic aspect of his nascent instrumentalism" and "despite some unhappy phrases of Engels,"
neither he nor Mam believed in a "univocal causal determination of matter or things in history"** (which is indeed true),
and that his followers have translated his "reIiance on 'processes
a t work in the order of things' " into the "mythical Ianguage of
the 'inwitability' of the development from capitalism to so-

cialiam,"***

8

"Assuming a definite direction and rate in the productive
relations of the social order and the relative constancy of certain
human behavior patterns, Marx predicted that the social rewlution would take place. Not inevitably, of course.
"****
T o one acquainted with Marx the statement is so bold and
bore-faced as to evoke a kind of smpifitd admiration, and when
one reads in an article by the same author, pub1ished only
twcIve months before: "Against t h i ~it might be urged that
Mam believed rocidism to bt inevitrble in the nature of things,
md that it would realize itself by some sort of dialectic neces-

. ..

thing like that is the s u b s m a nad

+"**

dg

What a pitiable Karl Msrrt, what a paor fitfd
Gemam***ind&the iron r~ecessi?yof a u ~ d
all, but was just indicating
.+miwtcndcncies that might or might not arrive at the result be
.qoparsionately desiredi
"Anyone who has read carcfullg
" aaya Sidney Hook.
'htMarr himself found one careful reader of his book, C#d,
M c a d that he selected him for a tribute in tbc second editipn,
,md here is what M a d s o m careful reader says in t h e new
prtf ace where Mam immortalized him :
out one thing: t~ show, by
tion, the necessity of m m s r i ~ tdeterconditions, and to establish, as imprrtidy as pomible, the facts that m e him far fundamental
stwthg-points. For this it is quite enough, if he provcs, at rhe
. ,same tinit, both tbe ntcessitg of the preacnt order of things, and
the necessity of another order into which the first mugt intpit,ably
pass over; and this aII &a aarnt, whether men believe or do
qot believe it, whether thq are GQ~&QW or UI~COU&OUS of it.
Ma= treats the social movement as' a p-s
of mtural history,
- 'governedby Iaws not only independent of human wiit, condous-

...

X h d l h - I ~ ,
V d % Na%pS9L
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nea and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining
that will, consciousnetus and intelligcnm"
Upon this and further statements from a reader chosen by
himaelf for commendation, Marx merely remarks : "What else
is he describing but the dialectic method?''

Doa it not begin to be clear that Hook is not inquiring
into and expounding Marx's philosophy, but trying to hold it up
among modern scientific ideas and assumptions 3 Marx did not
have the instrumental conception of knowledge invented by
Dewey, nor did anybody, nor could anybody, have had it before
Darmrin. What service is performed, and toward what end, by
loading all this additional cant and confusion into a philosophy
that Map never gave any steady thought to, and never wanted
to produce in the first place? One can pardon a great man-ofaction like Trotsky, whose own iron determination has been so
long projected into the laws of history that he mistakenly fears
to displace it lest it be lost, whose knowledge and passion are
so fused togcthcr as to be perhaps at his age inseparable. But
we see none of this iron determination or passion in Sidney
Hook. He mnts two spiritual fathers where one is too many.
He wants above all things to be a philosopher. For philosophy's
sake-not for the revolution, not for the truth-he is bent on
reinterpreting dialectic materialism at any cost, to prevent
Marx's thought from becoming scientific.

DAS KAPITAL BECOMES AN "ILLUSTRATION"
That Hook has no deeper aim than to preserve the philosophic attitude as such, is shown by his next major operation,
which is to throw out all of Manc's scientific conclusions as mere
"illustrations of a method." He concedes to those who have
attacked Man's doctrines as contradictory that "if they are
mnsidcred in independence of the method they illustrate and
the historical context in which they arose, they do appear con-

a method of revolutionary criticism"

1.. "The method, to be sure," he adds, "is to be c h d d up
light of his conrluiom but the lattcr are derivative* not
. They are tentative and contingcn~''
to Mr. Hook it must be cxplsriacd here zhgt the
ss atruggk is not, according to him, an "illustm
rx'a other wnclusions, but is bound up in the
thod itself. Indeed, it is the essential meaning and pupme
this d t a t i o n of method over rcswlts to protect the c l w
c in economics md declare it ridt. The method is
titicism demands a atandpoinb a
the standpoint of the &se
mope. His pmition impfi~d
bconomiut at basis always is a dam economics.
icit d u e judgment becomes one of the orbsdm in
which its analytic equations are written."
ask here :If both kin&

..

do you h o w which w

dialectic philomphy step
cs is right because it is datasrn economics and Marx has alreadp
on of the universe and of "alI history"
. &h very pIan of procedure. As Sidney Hook says in his M e t e
physics Of Pr~~grn~criswr,
"A 'pure' method which does not inw1I'~ereference to a theory of uristcnce is devoid of meMarx's method is not a pure method but a diaItctic method,
.and it is valid only in so far a8 existence itself, or at least a m i d
dstence, is d i a l e c t i 4 s engaged, that is, in a procedure by
m a l e and its resoIution, "from the lower to the higher," or
ther words, in the direction in which the M a d a n wiahes to
's condusim, therefore, in the name
he xashIp betrays himseIf with that

1

in tbb acaioa are dl h tbn article la T h Sym#erim, JalJ,
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word "illustration"4idney Hook is only insisting that hfarxism
abandon t8c competition with science and rest its case absolutely
upon its e-ce
aar o philosophy, a class-biased theory of exiattnce.
His loading off upon poor Engels the sin of L'deviatiag'y
from this position is, however, entirely fantastic, Nobody engaged either in scientific research or in practical effort ever
remained loyal to an animistic philosophy, or ever could. It is
not class economia, for example, to say that goods are exchanged; it is a fact. It is a fact that money passes from hand
to hand. Both these facts are inherent parts of the theory of
Dm K + t d If these parts are objective truth verifiable by aU,
where do the parts begin which are merely revolutionary criticism, valid only for "the proletariat of Western Europe"? Tht
mere fact that this question can be asked and an answer imagined, show8 the folly of pretending that serious research can
be engaged in without the assumption of a truth which, whether
interesting or not, is at lenrt valid for everybody.
hat practical cffort requires such an assumption, and
requites such truth, is stiU more obvious. "The purpose of
Mnrx's intellectual activity," says Sidney Hook, "was the overthrow of the existing order." Well, you couldn't overthrow a
fence-post, could you ?--could you turn over a fried egg neatly
and properrJ?-+&out knowing something, and something not
"tentative and contingent," either, but central and sure and rcliable, something verified in the manner of the "hypotheticaldeductive system," something without value judgments implicit
in its abscia~z,if I may pretend to understand what that means,
-something,
in short, that the man who was trying to stop
ym would h n t to know too? It is the nced to eliminate the
alternative, to make sure of the victory of your tfort--a need
dictated, remember, by the nature of animistic thinking, not by
the nature of revolutionary men-that gives rise to this whole
prodigious effort to keep up the bluff that Mantian economics
in rso far as it is any good is not straight science.
Enget could no morc keep up the blufi than Marx could,
and Engtls had to finish tbt book-that is the extent of his
deviation. And Sidney Hook can no morc keep it up than Engels
could In the verp article in which he informa us that all Marx'u
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mere 3uottatim of a method, a d rPot b b'Wh
in $cnma&hb6

ddedudve coudmaiona like

ndimental charactt~ofthe culture mmpltx ia de=
the mode of economic produdon prevalent at any
ims: "All of M a d s work was in the nature of
hprpothesk

. . ,''

&all we sav of a man who inform us a t the be&
&:of an essay &a< a11 of Marxts doctrina are ~ustra&c
not hypothetical-deductive, and not valid q t far the
c context" in which they am-d
in the condusim
Be bamc essay inform us that ''all of M a d s work was in
Biattlre of evidence" for r hypotht~isar to what is the deterk g factor in alC historic c a r t ~ t s ? Can we sly a milder
&than that he is not interested in clarifying the revolutionary
r getting forward with the work- but is trying to premere ernrrticd attitude of the ~hiloso~hcr
at mv cost 2
b.' H . d h e a mbre practical purpor~he A d a c w r have
wn that word "ilustration." For while it is true, from.*
ct atandpoint of the dialectic philorophy, that & Marx7n
usions a r t but tcmwrarrr a~~licrrtions
of his method. which
t

You might ,think that having dumped everything else out
dialectic materialism but the method, Hook's operation would
comp1ete. Surely the method will be left standing as the
t Mamians expounded it. But no! Here too there bas
a crass deviation. Engels thought the dialectic movement
to be found in material things, and that the method was
fore applicable in physics and chemistry and biology. He
the better part of tight years, in fact, applying it to the
a1 sciences, or rather translating their findinp into the
s of the dialectic. Lenin insisted that this world's "ordered

a
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movement of matter in motion" is dialectic through and through,

and held this to be the unconscious assumption of the "immcnse
majority of natural scientists." h d all Ruwian men of science
dcsiroue to stand in with the government have acceded to this
propo~itiun,and gone through some sort of verbal exercises in
evidence of their political loyalty and orthodox faith. Hook,
however, is not so naive in thest matters as Engels and Lcnin,
and he ia not constrained by the Soviet government, and therefore ht is perfectly aware that if you bothered a modern hardworking chemist or biologist or physicist with intrusions of this
so-called "method of thinking," he would kick you out of his
laboratory as a nuisance.
Hook is also reckless enough to remember that Hegel origixlaIly invented this idea of dialcctic logic to explain certain
proceeding8 in which mind is involved--to explain, in fact, a
worId fundamentally composed of mind and behaving as a mind
behaves. He sees how crudely anthropomorphic it really was
to call a materid world dialectic. Hegel's Ianguage, he re&Iessly
reminds us, "reveals a continual implicit reference to consciousness and the activity of consciousness."* Moreover, it is of the
essence of the dialectic philosophy-and this tvtn Hook will
not f o r e g e t h a t it belongs to the working class, and is in fact
a method of criticism from the standpoint of the "class conscious
proletariat of Western Europe.'' And Western Europe is too
sophisticated to believe there is a bourgeois and a proletarian
method in phyaics or chemistry. "To read the class struggle
back into nature," says Hook, "is to imply that all nature is
conscious-a proposition which only an Hegelian ideafist can
accept."**
Fox these good and sufficient reasons, having for similar
reasons thrown out of dialectic materialism practically everything there was in it but the method, Hook proceeds to throw
out the method in so far as it *plies to the material world.
What we have to do, he tells us, is to dissociate this dialectic
method from "illtgitimate attempts to extend it to natural
phenomena in which human consaousness does not enter," * * *
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b t l f never spoke of the

d thought?*****
~C-U
of barley s e d . And Mam too muse have
og to sleep, when &gda read
haat waked up just in tiphc
t 1 Great mff l Go ahead!"
k e n d e e p or -ti
their philosophy dialectic mortarialiwa,
is now, according to Sidney &oh a
that the world is not uniformly mamaterial it is not dialectic !
too, as cvcrpheert, Hmk.getsinto mntrabction
historic pairsibititits, but with biself. H
t hadl
dedarcd that dialectic materialism d m not believe in
m of stuff" but st "monim of law," and has amded
of "deviating" in prtmthg it as "a monistic sptem
of a unified methd" He forgets all about that now,
M e beliema in ip l d i s t n of law,
accuses Engels of "deviating" because he presented Mat.
a "unified method"u1akilrg its dialectic apply, that in,
hout nature as well as sctdety and the mind of msm.
threw over the monism of s f d l in favor of the monism
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of law, as we noted, in order to make dialectic materialism safe
against science. He now throws over the monism of law for
the sime reason4ecause the "distinctive character of the dialectic in Marx's theory of history lies in ciass-consciousness md
sctios which breaks through polar oppositions . . . "* and procceda by sudden leap8 and jumps. Natural scientists do nor find
such a mode of action dominant in the physical world; therefore
the dialectic must be withdrawn from that world. "There is
no need to show that there are eudden leaps and jumps in
nat&e to justify revolution in society," he say4--conccding9 by
the way, that the real use of the dialectic in social science is to
"justify rcvolution," not to achieve it--but at least still heroically trying to save the face of this "method of thinking" when
confronted by the faas and methads of modern science.

NOTE
Since I wrote the above passage, Sidney Hook has been
attacked by the official communists for his assertion that the
dialectic does not apply to physical nature, and has denied that
he ever 'made such an assertion.**
"If, by dialcctic," he says, "we mean the laws of motion,
polarity and the transformation of quantity into quality--then
dialectic is universal, appEts to nature as well as to man-and
I have never denied it. But the distinctively Martcirm concep
tion of dialectic is historical and sociaL"
The communists accuse him here of "a sudden lapse of
memory, to put the matter mildly," and they cat1 attention to his
demand in the article in The S y m p o s i u ~that the dialectic be
"disassociated from the illegitimate attempts to extend it to
natural phenomena in which human consciousness does not
enter."

They might also have quoted his articIe, From Hegel to

Me:***

"In Hcgel the dialectical process b expressed not only in
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is certainly not adequate to reply: "If, by
, we mean the Iaws of motion, eQ,, then &ale& a p p b
re and I have never denied it." Tbt L an e p u o o r l
, I h d , upon investigation, &at it is a
The equivocation has been ,in Hook's atammB
c and natute all along. Here ir what ha sap
,From H e p i TOMarx :
ere are two sense^ in which one may sptak of a natural
commo~~plice.Change is o b s e d l c
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elasive an opponent upon this question. His position might be
summed up by saying: "There is something rather dialectic
a b u t nature, but after aU nature is not very dialectic and the
real thing is onIy to be found where consciousness plays a role."
And this queer and vague and totally un-Marxian way of talking, is an even better proof of what I am trying to prove, than
his bare stattments that the dialectic docs not apply to physical
nature. It is r proof that Hook is not trying to discover and
expound the nature of the dialectic philosophy as Marx believed
in it, but is trying to amend that philosophy to the extent ntcrssary to make it stand up in the face of modern viem of science.
He is constrained whto confronted by the documents to admit
that Marx believed physical nature to be dialectic, but he in
tonstrained by the facts of modern science to deny that this
notion has any place in the laboratory. His straddling or his
"lapse of memory," whichever you decide to call it, is one more
evidence of the nature of the task on which hc is engaged and
of its hopelessness.

THE DIALECTIC REDEFINED
No man seeking the truth about Marxism or about the
world, or seeking to clarify minds for the good of the revolution,
could tangle himself up in these self-contradictions. His motive
would keep his mind dear. Sidney Hook is trying to win a case.
He is defending the Mamian Talmud at the bar of modern
science.
For this purpose he has not only to withdraw the diulectk
from the physical world, but he has to withdraw from the diaIectic a good deal of what made it interesting. The division of
a developing totality into "triadic phases," he t e h us, "is not
logically essential to the method." In fact, this whole business
of thesis, antithesis and resolution in a higher unity--always
of more use to Christian priests than pagan scitntis-ay
now go by the board. All we need is two "phasea" and a "s$e-
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cific relation of opposition betwecn thoac phwhich ga
&m
..
a SUCCCSS~C)Hof other phases,"
To be more exact: "The sufficient condition of a dialec- '
tical situation is given when these two phases present a relation
of opposition and inscrsction such that the rcsdt ( I ) txpibi?
something qualitatively new, ( 2 ) preserves some of thc stme
tural elements of the interacting phases, and (3) eliminates
others."*
It is obvious that these conditions are met whenever anything whatever grows or develops-all except one, and that iq
that there must be an "opposition" between two "phases," and
this opposition must "gtneratzte" other phases. In other word*
since we have now limited the application of this method to
social history, and since "alI hi~toryis a history of claswtruggles'?-this is merely s grandiose, abstract, non-empirical, and
therefore fruitlessly philosophic, way of making the simple
remark that society progresses by the method of claswtmggi~.
A few minor "totalities" can be singled out within society, to
be sure, and shown to follow the same "lawy'-the g r d of
personality, for instance. But that is not really relevant or
necessary. "The Marxian totality is social," and the relations
within this totality as at present constituted ''take the form of
opposition between proletariat and capitalist, the necesbiti~of
production and the need of consumption, and so forth. All of
these oppositions constitute a whole.
They cannot be s o l d
without changing the whole. At a certain point
, the
brium is destroyed and reconstituted by human actiuls
the
dialectic principIe appears as class activitg."
And that is about all there is left of the dialectic principle.
For Marx and Engeb, who really compelled themselva to
believe that all nature advances by a process of contradiction
and resolution, and that their program of class struggle t o ~ r d
communism was but one instance of this universal law, there
was some reason to dress up the progra-t
least on holidays
,and solemn occasion+in this remote, grandiose and abstract
language. But when you have thrown the dialectic out of dl
the rest of the world except human society, and practiemrUy restricted its application to the class struggle, what is the uee of
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t&&g to this highly general language any longer? Why say
''t~t~lfity"
when you mclln "sodsty"? Why say "phases" when
you mean cfwsesf Why say that "the driving force in the dt*dopent of a dialectical situation is derived from thc conflict
and opposition of the elements within it," when you mean that
the capit&$s can only be exproprirrted by an orgaaiad t i a s s
struggle? What is, in s t l honesty, the actual gain made, when
you have frankly limited your meaning to particular things, in
continuing to use the language of univtrsal knowledge ? If, in
osdtr to save the dialectic philosophy, Mr. Hook has been cornpclled to throw out, not only everything in it besides the dialectic,
but a h to throw out the u~iversafityof the dialectic, what is the
whole operation for? Is it not the essence of phiIoaophy to
derciibe the universa1 characters of being? And if his laws of
dialectic apply genuinely only in human society, is it nor sociology
rather than philosophy that he is regaling us with?

To anyone who really believes that philosophy ia, at large,
an attempt to describe the universal characters of being, the
question is cogent, and it seems ahnost impossible to guess what
Mr.Hook is about. Bat if we hold fast to thc derogatory conception of philosophy-not, of course, denying the possibility of
an attempt to describe the universal characters of being--as
an attempt to preserve the animistic attitude, the sense of cooperation between man and the objective world, by reading into
the universal ideas and abstractions employed by science, a little
of his own inttrast and his own wish, then the answer becomes
very simple indeed. Scierlce has accomplished so much, and
gained such a power over our minds, with its sovereign method
of suspending the wish or interest during the definition of fact,
that it is no longer possible, except in the sphere of sociology
where it hati accomplished Uttk or nothing, to keep up the
. pretense that wish and definition can wisely be confused. Only in
this sphere can one still with any plausibility read the subjective
purpose into the objective facts. Sidney Hook has ceased to impute the daswtruggle-towar~ommunismprocedure to univers a l being, because Re senses aU around him in this age of science
the impossibility of makiig it stick. But he retaina the language
of universal knowledge, because that will still hdp him in the
sufficiently forlorn effort to make it ati&+therwisc than as a
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plan of procedure toward a sspcdfic en&in
contemplattd by the soda1 adencts.

the sphere ~f;%@g'
".

In x 928 Mr.Hook was still, it seems, in the ds&c p d b
of the philasopher. At least he w a ~d d h g philmofiy
-I
"generalized thought," and was not yct mnsciously mtrictbg the application of the "dialectic" to the social and p@do@cd
fields. "The 'dialectict for Marx," he was saying, "is not soms
a.

,

...

thing working ~xclusiwelyin things
but it is primsl~ilpin
things as rt condition precedent to human action."* It wm only
in 1932 that he proclaimed the "deviation" involved in imagining
that the didectic worka in things, and it was only then that he

declared philosophy to be, for Ma=, not generalized thought
at dI but highly particularized c r i t i c i d t i c i s m confuted to
the field of ethics, politim and sociology, and therein frrrnaEp
anchored to its own "prmuppositiuns and bias," Philmophy he
nbw dehca as a conscimsly class-biased "sodology of &tbl
investigating the soda1 roots and conditions of what human
beings desire."**

This shows a state of growth, even if not of "dialectics,"

in Mr. Hook himself, and suggests quite irresistibIy, that a few
mare years will bring him out on the road of common sense and
science. For when philosophy abandons the pretense to be x
disinterested account of reality at large, and frankly admodedges ita particular field and its particular bias, retaining ontp
the name of philosophy and the language of thc universal &ategories, it has but a short life left. Science will not neglect to
study in its cooler way the "social roots and conditions of what
men desire." And however difficult in this field its dort to be
disinterested, however often its name may become a screen for
mere &ss propaganda, in the long m nevertheless men who
wish to know f act-for whatever p u r p o e w i l l seek them f m
thoae who aspire to be diminterested, not from those who judfp
a "frankly avowed
bias" by calling it philosophy and using
general terms for particular tbings.
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A PECULIARITY OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

There arc mo real obstacles, however, on Mr. Hook's
road home to common sense. One is the indubitable fact that
social science, in so far as it looks into the future, does differ
radicaUy from the so-called natural sciences. It differs in that
the scientist himself is a part of the process he is studying, and
his own judgment, his very predictian, may affect the result.
Where other scicnces strive by every artifice to "eliminate
the personal equation," a study of social evolution--even though
striving to be "pure" science and leaving others to apply its
knowledge- ncmrtheless cannot eliminate the personal factor
without falsifying the facts. And though this may seem a slight
matter when the personality of any one scientist is concerned,
it becomes a mighty factor when you realize that authorized
science as such is concerned. Nobody will deny the important
position occupied by science among the "social roots and conditions of what men desire," nor the momentous effect which
systematic verified knowledge is going to have upon the fuhre
of mankind. What the social scientist thinks, therefore, during
the progress of a Iarge scale experiment may decide the result
of the experiment. This makes the philosophic attitude, and
most particularly the "dialectic method of dinking" peculiarly
plausible here. For that so-called "method of thinking," as
we have seen, is not a "method of t b i g " + x c e p t
merely
as it emphasizes that all things are in a process of fluid change
and warns against the danger of fixed concepteit is a method
of justifying rr class bias in thinking about social probIems. It
is an ingenious scheme for reading a successful revolutionary
result into the objective facts; and thus getting a chance to throw
the weight of science--or something even higher than science-on the side of the proletariat. This weight might itself conceimbly tip the scales in favor of the proletariat-just as a belief that he is going to gct well may help to cure a patient, no
matter what sort of hocus-pocus it is founded on. In my apinion,
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this very limited utility of the b d c f in the diaIe.de $otp&pocw
is not worth a snap of the fingers compared to the adt~tagcs
of a clear and undeluded scientific confrontation of fa&ad ,
the corrcspondencc between Hook and Trotsky in T k *
N
.
Vol. 137,No. 3548; if you want to see what n murky anqb
unfruitful lucubrations you get into when you try to sdjwt &q
relations between objective science and a frankly drrsd~hd
sociology. Hook himself has been compelled to admit in @
long run (and this is one further sign of hope for him) thqf
the class-bias in the Marxian economics lies only in a s c l c E t i q
among objectively verifiable facts of those relevant to 'the prole
tarian revolutionary purpose.* And, of course, the deliberate
seIection of facts, or aspects of fact, relevant to a spcc%c purpose is not bias at all-much less dialectic p h i l o s o p h ~ u $
merely applied science.

That the evils of Talmudism, and all the other evils that 1
have shown to flow from this metaphysical justification of prejudiced thinking, * * would be offset by the alight conceivable' gain
to the revolution involved in getting it established in the scab
of authentic science, seems to me a preposterous idea. However, the question does not have to be settIed, for the issue does
not arise. You cannot get a classbiased system of philosophical
ideas into the seats of science. Science has grown too great and
is too wtIl aware of its own nature. All you will accomplish
by insisting on this mttaphyaical apotheosis of prejudice is to
repel scientific minds in increasing numbers from the ranks of
the revolution. -And that, in the effort to change the ownership
of a gigantic and complex tcdrnical apparatus like the American
machine of production and distribution without stopping or destroying it, is a strategic error so colossal as to push dl other
considerations into the background. When Hook says frankly,
as he does, that this thing, once so well advertised to us as
scientific socialism, is not science, he gives the revoIutionists a
fair warning that they have got to drop it or lose their fight.
Sce his b k , Tmuardr Tkr Undmimdi~gof Karl Mwx, pp. 108-9-10.

** In

the concluding chapter# of my bwlr, Marx And L&
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MARXISM AND PRAGMATISM

The second obstacle on Sidney Hook's road home to common sense is the philosophy of pragmatism, or "instrumenta1ism," in which as a disciple of John Dewey he believes. It is
not only in order to defend dialectic materialism against science,
but in order to identify it with "scienrific" pragmatism that
Mr. Hook bas thrown all the insides out of it, leaving only the
so-caUed "method of thinking." It is for the same purpose
that he has cut down the application of that method to the
social and moral sciences, and thrown out of it, moreover, evey
feature sbarply distinguishing it from a mature scientific procedure except one--the right of the thinker to a class bias. By
these heroic operations he has arrived where he can say:
"Marxism therefore appears in the main as a huge judgment of practice, in Dewey's sense of the phrase, and its truth
or falsity (instrumental adequacy) is an experimentaI matter.
Believing it and acting upon it helps to make it true or faIse."*
That is the very end and goaI of Hook's whole operation
upon dialectic materialism. Seeing that this philosophy in its
crude nineteenth century form will no longer stand u p y o u can
no longer pretend that the world itself is with dialectic necessity
achieving the aims of the revolution-he transforms it into a
twentieth century philosophy, a more up-to-date method of accomplishing the very same identification of theoretic truth with
proletarian program-of-action. "Truth" itself, he cries, is nothing but the successful workmg of an idca; the process of verification is a making m e . Or,t o put it in Dewey's own language:
"The effective warking of an idea and its truth are the same
thing-this working being neither the cause nor the evidence of
truth, but its nature."
There is a difference between Hook's program of action
and Dcwey's, however. There was a difference, at least when
Dewey's phiIosophy took form. Dewey brought over from Hegel
Afdsrrr Qwrttdy, Vol.

IV, Na 4, p.

391.
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only the ideal of identifying theoretical and practical'm.&u8ness. He never studied Manc; he did not accept the da8g
gte; and he had no use for the dialectic. Sidney Hook not w&
wants to identify the theoretical and practical consciotlmc~philosophic knowledge, that is, with program of action-but ha:
wants to identify with his philosophic knowledge the
program of class struggle. That leads him to try not only to
attribute Dewey's instrumental philosophy to Kad Marx, but
also to try to graft the Marxian dialectic upon Dewey's instrumental phiIosophy. 1 venture to predict that john D e w y
whether pleased or displeased to be told that Karl Marx anticipated his most original thoughts-will at least never agree to
father the dialectic part of Hook's Marxian pragmatism Dewey
may be forced by the rapidy developing facts to accept the
class struggle as a practical program of political action in the
given situation. But it is too late for him-and moreover he
is too canny and too close to the scientific point-of-vim--to trg
to read that back into the universe as a half-hearted philosophy
of being. X-Ie will find dialectic materialism, as a 4'judgmentof
practice," a little too "huge" to be proven true even by the success of the League For Independent Political Action.

With that sole exception, however, the net result of Hook'@
heroic operations upon Mancism is to bring it into substantial
identity with Dewey's pragmatism. Dewey and his pupil are at
one in the belief that a special kind of thinking-whether "dialectic" or not--ought to prevail in the social, moral and political fields, and in giving to this thinking, no matter how "operative and experimentat" it may become, the name of philosophy.
It is just in these spheres, indeed, that, after denying the philoso.
pher any special knowledge of "rcalityt'-to the horror of aU
his professorial colleague+Dewcy still finds him a special function over and above what the men of science have to do. It
was, moreover, a preoccupation with moral and social problcms
that led Dewey in the f i s t place to work out his special "scientific" kind of pragmatism. I think it might be said that hir
central prob1e-s
o philosopher-has
bcen to extend the
volitional view of truth which seems natural in these ~phcres,
because the experimenter is a part of the exptrinncnt, to the
sphere of natural science, where the experimenter neerrm to bold
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his txpcrimcnt off from him, and try his best to get a decision
&at will be valid objectivety and whether he is there ox not.
k my opinion, Dewey has not succeeded in accomplishing
this. 1 think that when you state that "the effective working of
an idea and its truth arc tbe same thing," you are stating a
thing which you believe true in some other sense than because
it is working effectively. And it is this other kind of truth,
truth which is an attribute of the relation of an effectively working idea to the facts worked upon, that natural scientists are
trying to discover. I think the sense of a fluid union of the
thinking mind with the matter thought about which Dewey arrives at through this definition of truth, and through his extraordinary temperament, although a fascinating speculative txperitnce, is illusory. It is but a last desperate attempt to keep up
in the face of science-and by inserting it into the very procedure
of scienc-orne
vestige of that sense of some friendly cooperation between the objective world and the mind of man which
has been the main concern of phiIosoplly from the beginning.
Even in the social and moral sciences, it is possible to say
that our believing and acting upon an idea helps to make it true
only in so far as the definition of the idea is in some way incomplete. If all the term of the problem an idea proposes to solve
can be and are stated, then no such magicsounding thing will
follow. This may be very well illustrated in the statements just
preceding Sidney Hook's assertion that Marxism is a huge judgment of practice and that our believing helps to make it true.
Let me quote the whole passage:
"
. .The reading of history in terms of class struggle leads
to its intensification; the theory of surplus value provided a
powerful ethical motivation and rallying cry in industrial distress.
Marxism therefore appears in the main as a huge judgment of
practice, and its truth or falsity (instrumental adequacy) is an
experimental matter. Believing it and acting upon it helps to
make it true."
But h e truth of the reading of history in terms of class
struggIe will not be affected by the success of the futurc experiment, except in so far as you did not make clear just what
history you were taking about-whether past or future-and
just how large a role you were attributing to the class struggle

.

in it. Nor will the truth of the surplur d u e theory be
by the success of the revolution d e u it~ is abstractly formulated
with that end in view. If it reads a1 I have restated it h mj
book: There is enough concrete fact underlying the abstract
talk about surplus value to warrant wr going h e a d with the
class struggle and trying to win the revolution--then the 8Ue
cess of the rcvoIutim only ~ O V G Jit true, for it w a s true b t f o s
'The thing becomes still more crudeIy evident in other passages where Hook labots to get rid of that "myth of the hcvitability" of communism which ht attributes to the deviators
from Mam's philosophic views.
"When Marx spoke of comrnunisrn as being st remit of
'social necessity'," he sap, "he was referring to the resultant
of a whole social process, one of whose components was the da
velopment of economic conditions, the other the assertion ;of a
rtvolutionary class will."* In other words, when Marx said ncccssary, he meant possible. (It would be interesting to b o w
through what peculiar mental or lingual adiction it came about
that M a n so often said "necessary" when he meant "pos~&lc."
Both words are to be found in the German dictionary* It would
also be interesting to know why, when his followtr~mid "necessary," they did not mean possible, but meant necessary, and
thus translated Marx's simple good sense into the "mythical
language of the 'inevitability' of communi~rn.'~)
Ho*ever, that is not my point at the moment. M y pohh
is that if you express your idea circumspectly--a8 for b
stance, to say possible when you mean possible, and to say
"such-and-such a result will follow if we do thukand*?
when that is all you really know, then the idea is not "made
true" by your successful action. It was true all the time and
you have only proven it so. Tf, however, you express your ides
loosely--as philosophers so often are compelled to do-and
say, "Such-andduch a thing is going to happen," md then go
and act in such a way that it does happen, why, it may be contended that you have made the idea tme.
All this is rather rudimentary, and it is moreover old s d
that has been answered by John Dewey to the satisfaction of
disciples many times. It is just here, indeed, that we
The Sjmpm.ium, July, 1991, p. 949.
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WAND OF DIALlEllC MATERIALISM

d the ~ s t n t i a la e t m c e between the "mgstica1
of James and the f'sci~tificp ~ n p a t i s m "of Dtwcy
d the "truth" of an idea that had SUCCWSslog over the edges of its meaning aa
e terms of the s p d c problem Aad
d w c y ' ~&men dtscipk, xareful repudiator, too, of
pragmatism" of WiXam James, inf ~rmingus that
z ~ ~ ~ r & ~ ' ' . -more
- n o and no leas &an &at-''Mxlnr"
is
J '"huge judgment of practice" that can be made true by be1i.mand acting upon it. Marxism is indeed hug-probably
the hugest b4judgmmtg'
wo. proven true by a spedbr lhr of
aaim in a t m p r q situation since Mom came down the
mountah with the wards af the Eternal engraven in stom.
For my part, I W it is no accident that one of John
Dewey's chusen di~ciplett=a effect such a manower with his
ddhitim of truth-and &at, top, with no proteet from the
master. I thiak-although 1 have not the space h e t o prove
i t 4 ~ Dewey's
t
''truth" is less mystical than that of JimanEy became Dewey's interests lie in ~s world and James had
a strong flair for the next. Theg are both concerned aar philog*
phe-d
1 dbtinguish the philasophtr in each from the grtat
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student of the human mind-+ defend a last vestige of animism
widat the hard dictates of &the acientik point-a£-view. T h
are concerned to reconcile man's needs and wisheio with the procof the natural world by theorizing about truth, mi merely
.bhdinpr out what the truth is and thanging the world
It b indeed st very thin remnant of the animistic attitude
that .Dewey gives us, and in stepping s u c ~ i v e l yfram the name
"prrsgmatism" to "scientific pragmatism," and then to "hstrwmtntdim," and finally wen abandoning that excellent word for
the term "sperational logic" invemd by a physicist, it h a s a b s t
an air of apologizing for its thinnas and whhing to *ankh altogether. If it shodd vanish--if Dewey should by the grace
of laatwe and experience porn to be not od? the first American
pkiiil-r,
but thc last philosopher*--we shodd hrmve a most

precious thirsg left in the place of his definition of truth. We
&odd have Itft the sage advice that, siacc the mind is such a
fam@h of the body as it is, we must seek out the specific cle-

a k h ~ X ~ P f h e l o l t r t ~ a m m " g t a ~ D d ~ e ~

I

'I

ASTUDYOFSIDNEYHOOK'S-M

,-.'

merit of purpose in every idea that lays elrrim to
and carefully and boldly know and understand
beware of its false grandiose pretenses. It is upan,
that I have acted in my analysis and restatement of
theories, and it is for that reason that I a#a& 5 0
the last stand of the priest-indisguise, this philosophy o
pragmatism so ingeniously pieced together by Sidnty Hoe%
of two of his most plausible decaying vestments.
I
Marx's philosophy enabled a substantial relic of
to ride along upon the post-Newtonian science of tht BritSh
and French enlightenment. Dewey's enables a morc meagre4 ,
relic to ride along on Darwin and the post-Darwinian &cam.
The two devices are not, and cannot be the same. And that b:
why Hook contradicts hirnrself as well as the documents and
'.
the very possibilities of thought's history, in attempting to identify them, tangling himself up in a very welter of desperately
TI
schoIarly self-contradictions. But he does this bccaust he fe&,
r
and feel truly, that one of their intimate motives and emotional
outcomes is the same--namely, to combine knowledgesf-fact
with program-of-action,or, as he says in one of his own eloquent
conclusions, "to fuse the logic of analysis with the poetry of
passion."
It is absolutely beyond a doubt that as experimental howledge develops and becomes more precise and convincing in the
fields of psychology and sociology, these last attempts to stay
the hand of science will go down, and we shall find itn morc
cool but equally purpase-serving procedure, and its resolute,
yet by no means negative, or passive, scepticism about ultimate
problems, established in every department of being and dl practical effort. Those who wish to preserve the rich contribution
of Marxism to science will not be diverted by Hook's heroic
effort to defend the husk of the Marxian philosophy. They
will go back to the original intention of Karl Marx himself to
have done with "philosophy" and try upon the basis of tmpixical
scientific findings to revoIutionize the world, and they will carry .
that intention through.
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